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THE TRANSLANTIC CHARTER POLICY OF
THE UNITED STATES
Lucile Sheppard Keyes*
In the years since the Second World War the Civil Aeronautics
Board has consistently adopted more liberal positions regarding
international charter traffic. In this article Mrs. Lucile Keyes
examines the history of the decline of restrictive governmental
charter policies and the effect that the new liberal policies have
had on both the airline industry and the public. Mrs. Keyes sup-
ports the less restrictive policy and argues that reason does not
support a return to the older position of restraint in the forseeable
future.
972 is a landmark year in the development of governmental
policy toward international air transportation. In this year, the
governments of both the United States and the United Kingdom
abandoned longstanding restrictive attitudes toward the air trans-
portation of passengers by charter carriers and by charters operated
by scheduled carriers, and thereby substantially reduced their sup-
port for the protectionist regime of the International Air Transport
Association which has been in force since World War I.1 By the
year's end, these liberalized policies had been largely accepted in
principle by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC),
an organization composed of representatives of civil aviation au-
thorities of twenty European countries. These actions did not, of
course, represent sudden unexpected reversals of position, but
resulted directly from the experience of the postwar years, and
especially of the last decade. The following account of the develop-
* Ph.D., Radcliffe. Economist, Washington, D.C. Member, Board of Advisors,
The Journal of Air Law and Commerce.
I On this regime, see Keyes, The Making of International Air Fares and the
Prospects for Their Control, 30 J. AIR L. & CoM. 173 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Keyes].
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ment of U. S. policy will explain some of the reasons for the new
liberalism and point out some considerations which are relevant for
the determination of future policy.
The first three sections of the discussion deal primarily with
policy regarding supplemental charters; in the fourth section, the
development of policy toward charters conducted by scheduled
carriers-which is largely the story of IATA Resolution 045-
will be briefly dealt with in connection with the recent moves
toward liberalization of the regulatory framework. The two final
sections concern more general considerations: some basic reasons
for the success of the transatlantic charters and arguments against
future restrictive policies.
I. EARLY POLICY OF EXTREME CAUTION
From the end of World War II until 1961, U. S. governmental
policy toward independent international charter air carriage was
marked by an attitude of extreme caution. Thus, international
operations by non-scheduled airlines were limited severely from
the beginning by regulatory restrictions far more stringent than
those applied to their domestic operations. The dominant regulatory
view was that these carriers should participate in international
passenger carriage only to the extent of performing individual
charter trips that could not be accommodated by the scheduled
airlines.
In June 1947, when the Board adopted a new comprehensive
regulation covering (as the non-scheduled carriers were then
called) "irregular" air carriers, this class of carrier was generally
excluded from foreign air transportation of persons, although some
special strictly temporary exemptions were granted to certain com-
panies already engaging in such transportation. Assertedly because
scheduled service by U. S. and foreign air carriers had expanded
sufficiently to satisfy the demand for international travel, the Board
regarded further activity in this field by the irregulars as unjusti-
fied.' A prospective shortage of transatlantic charter accommoda-
tion in the peak seasons of 1949 and 1950, however, caused the
Board to authorize a limited number of planeload charter flights by
irregular and all-cargo carriers for the transportation of "bona fide
2Goldklang, Transatlantic Charter Policy-A Study in Airline Regulation, 28
J. AIR L. & CoM. 99, 100 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Goldklang].
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educational, charitable, and religious groups" between the United
States and Europe.'
Even at this early stage, there was reported evasion of the
requirement regarding "bona fide groups"; also, in some unfortunate
instances, travelers were stranded because of the lapses of irre-
sponsible travel agents.' The Board subsequently concluded that
"all of the persons handled by the supplemental carriers could
have been carried by the certificated lines with only a slight revision
in schedules"' and thenceforward
followed the policy of limiting the grant of exemptions for the
conduct of transatlantic charter flights chiefly to cases where (1)
regularly authorized carriers were unable or unwilling to provide
charter service at established charter rates (. . . right of first re-
fusal); (2) charter was essential to the success of the movement;
and (3) the proposed traffic involved charters as defined in section
207.1 of the Economic Regulations, and did not involve indirect
air carriers.'
Adopted in 1951, this section applied to both scheduled and non-
scheduled carriers. In effect, it prohibited
the offering by a direct air carrier of 'charter' services to individual
members of the public, and the performance by a direct air car-
rier of 'charter' services for an indirect air carrier, promoter of
'charter' groups, a ticket or travel agent, or for persons paying for
such 'charter' services an amount aggregating in excess of the direct
air carrier's duly published charter rate.7
under these strict limitations, very little transatlantic traffic was
carried by the supplementals. According to the Board, "Such sup-
plemental service was not needed even during the high season of
1952,"' and in the two succeeding years, only a limited number
of flights were authorized.'
Meanwhile, charter traffic on the scheduled carriers rose sharply,1'
3 Civil Aeronautics Board, Annual Report, 1949, p. 24; Annual Report, 1950,
p. 25.
4 Goldklang, supra note 2, at 102-04.
5 Id. at 106.
' The 1955 Transatlantic Charter Policy, 20 C.A.B. 782, at 782 (1955).
7 Id. at 782-83.
8 Annual Report, 1952, at 7.
9Annual Report, 1953, at 11; Annual Report, 1954, at 13.
10 Goldklang, supra note 2, at 109: "In 1952 IATA members carried 15,684
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and by 1954 a shortage of charter space had again developed on
the North Atlantic. 1 The Board, moreover, at this time had been
frustrated largely in its attempts to bring about lower transatlantic
fares by direct action. The agency believed that even the newly-
instituted tourist fares were "generally higher" than could be justi-
fied, and continued to exhort the scheduled airlines to modify
seating densities to reduce per-person costs and, ultimately, fares.'
In May 1955 the Board announced a "liberalization" of its
charter policy assertedly designed to "make it possible for groups
of people who would not otherwise be in a position to do so to
obtain the advantages of foreign travel so helpful to the develop-
ment of better international understanding."' " The requirement
that a charter be "essential to the movement" was abolished out-
right, and the "right of first refusal" was eliminated with respect
to single-entity charters and charters for furloughed military per-
sonnel. To "minimize [the] possible danger" of "adverse effects
upon the scheduled services of the regularly authorized trans-
atlantic carriers," Section 207 of the Economic Regulations was
retained and additional provisions were adopted concerning activi-
ties of promoters, indirect air carriers, and ticket agents.'
This minimal "liberalization" did not permit the supplementals
and all-cargo carriers to share in the considerable expansion of the
transatlantic charter market in the late 'fifties. In 1957 individually
exempted charters accounted for 31,063 passengers; in 1960 the
figure was only 28,728, and their share of the total market had
fallen to 17 percent, as compared with 44 percent in 1957." The
charter passengers across the North Atlantic. The following year, when tourist
fares were fully implemented, scheduled totals in tourist class rose from 188,701
in 1952 to 320,529; however, the number of charter passengers remained about
the same as in 1952. In 1954 charter totals had risen to 30,858 while all sched-
uled North Atlantic passengers totaled 550,000."
11 ACTA-IMATA Commercial Charter Exchange Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 760,
802 (1955): "Pan American experiences a transatlantic peak load eastbound in
the early part of the summer and westbound during the latter part. The tourist-
type charter business follows the seasonal trend. The airline witness testified that
between the 1st and 15th of July there isn't any air carrier on the Atlantic that
is able to satisfy the demand for any type of accommodation, including charters.
The airlines attempt to persuade tourists to put their trips off for a few weeks
to avoid the peak period."
'"Keyes, supra note 1, at 180-81.
" The 1955 Transatlantic Charter Policy, supra note 6, at 782.
141d. at 783.
's Transatlantic Charter Investigation, 40 C.A.B. 233, 294, 298 (1964).
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market in this period came to be dominated by the foreign route
carriers: in 1958, the year that the Board first authorized off-route
charters by this class of carrier,1 they carried 30.7 percent of pro
rata transatlantic charter passengers in the April-September period;
in 1960, the corresponding figure was 64.5 percent. (The peak of
75.1 percent was not reached, however, until 1963.)" While trans-
atlantic charter passenger traffic grew somewhat faster than trans-
atlantic passenger traffic as a whole, it remained below 10 percent
of the total throughout the period."
It was also during this period that basic criteria for charter
eligibility in the transatlantic market were developed and made
uniformly applicable to U. S. and foreign route carriers and U. S.
supplementals.8 When foreign charter airlines came on the scene
in the early 'sixties, they were subjected to similar standards.
II. CHANGE OF POLICY AND IMPACT ON IATA FARES
By 1960 the Board was ready to contemplate a sharp reversal
of its previous cautious policy toward international supplemental
charters. In the late 'fifties, U. S.-flag scheduled international air
operations had ceased to be dependent on governmental subsidy;
"Foreign Off-Route Charter Service, 27 C.A.B. 196 (1958).
1 Transatlantic Supplemental Charter Authority Renewal Case, Docket 20569,
Examiner's Recommended Decision, Appendix 1 (1970).
18 Derived from data in Transatlantic Charter Investigation, supra note 15,
at 294, 298.
1"Supplemental Air Carriers, Hearings before the Aviation Subcommittee of
the Committee on Commerce, U. S. Senate, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 1969
(1961), p. 72: " . . . the Board has granted individual authorizations for trans-
atlantic charter flights to carriers not otherwise thereunto authorized, but has
also imposed and from time to time has redefined standards for charter eligibility
of groups. Thus, in 1957, we amplified the general criteria for charter eligibility
which we had followed in 1955 and 1956. These criteria were largely those that
had been previously developed by the carriers and the Board, and had been em-
bodied in IATA Resolution 045 . . . In 1958, we made these criteria more spe-
cific and susceptible of precise application. And in 1959, we embodied them with
minor modifications in an Economic Regulation (Part 295) . . . [At about the
same time,] foreign air carriers were for the first time authorized to perform off-
route charters . .. [under Part 212 which] established as guides for issuance of
a charter authorization standards similar to those in Part 295. In 1960, after the
IATA carriers had finally undertaken, upon the Board's suggestion, to provide
more definitive and enforceable standards for their own operations, we undertook
to modify Parts 295 and 212 in order to conform our requirements in substantial
respects to those now provided in amended IATA Resolution 045. Consequently,
at such time charter requirements for all classes of transatlantic carriers had be-
come substantially similar."
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without this development, liberalization of the charter policy al-
most certainly would not have occurred." But other factors also
helped to create a climate favorable to a less restrictive course.
First, after years of relatively precarious authorization under
exemptions whose terms were subject to sudden change by admin-
istrative discretion, the domestic supplementals had been granted
temporary certificates of public convenience and necessity by the
Board in January 1959." Popular support for these suppliers of
low-cost air transportation, reflected in favorable Congressional
attitudes, apparently played a crucial part in bringing about cer-
tification." Indeed, the Board's action would have floundered in the
courts had it not been for timely rescue by special legislation."
It has been said that the supplemental carriers are the chil-
dren of the CAB. This is true, in the sense that they were not
inherited from the pre-1938 period in the manner of the scheduled
airlines, so that the Board from the beginning has exercised broad
"
0See, for example, the testimony of Board Chairman Alan S. Boyd, Id. at 38.
Commenting on early international charter policy, Boyd said: " . . . our
[scheduled] flag carriers were on subsidy up until 1957, I think, when Pan Amer-
ican went off subsidy. So we were not interested in permitting anything that could
possibly be considered a diversion from the subsidized carriers."
2 1971 Handbook of Airline Statistics 459.
'Senators Howard Cannon and John Sparkman both spoke in favor of the
supplemental carriers at the 1961 Hearings (supra note 19). The following testi-
mony by Senator Sparkman occurs at 122: "In both 1951 and 1953, the Senate
Small Business Committee held hearings and submitted reports to the Senate on
the role and the future of what were then called irregular airlines. . . . In each
of these reports, the Small Business Committee concluded that these fledgling
airlines, who had done so much to expand the frontiers of civil aviation during
the postwar years, deserved an opportunity to continue to serve the Nation ...
We concluded that the irregulars were undoubtedly making a tremendous con-
tribution to everyone concerned with civil aviation, because they were inducing
people to fly who never would have done so, had there not been a concept of
economical air transportation, as initiated and practiced by the irregulars. We
felt that the pie to be sliced was so much bigger that both the certified and the
noncertificated would have a bigger piece than would have been the case had
there been no irregulars."
" The original certificates provided authority to perform charter services plus
ten individually ticketed round trips per month between any two points, an au-
thority substantially similar to that previously enjoyed by these carriers under
exemptions. After reversal of this action in the Federal courts, temporary legis-
lation (P.L. 86-661, 74 Stat. 527, July 14, 1960) enabled continuance of this
authority until 1962, when a law was passed confirming the Board's power to
issue certificates for charter services only (P.L. 87-528, 76 Stat. 143, July 10,
1962). Special legislation was also forthcoming when the Board's authority to
permit the supplementals to operate inclusive tour charters had foundered in the
courts (see discussion below).
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discretion over their operating authority. But it is also true that
they were born on the "wrong side of the blanket" (their operations
having been initiated under an exemption originally intended for
small "fixed-base operators" essentially non-competitive with sched-
uled services); that they were kept for some years in a status of
dubious legitimacy under varying exemptions; and that they were
only finally admitted to the family of certificated carriers as dis-
tinctly junior members (charter services only) after considerable
congressional prompting. However, given the change of policy in
the domestic field, and its background in popular support, it is not
surprising that the Board should be moved to contemplate a similar
change in the international market.
At this time, also, the Board had severely criticized the scheduled
international airlines for not lowering fares in consonance with the
economies of jet operation. The "economy" fares put into effect
over the Atlantic on April 1, 1958, were instituted later and at
significantly higher levels than those favored by the Board. After
the adoption of these fares by the IATA, Board representatives had
journeyed to Europe to urge (without success) reconsideration of
these fares, and the agency subsequently continued to advocate
fare reductions." Since charter fares were generally far lower than
scheduled fares,'" some Board officials must obviously have savored
the prospect of accomplishing through charter competition what
direct regulatory influence had failed to do. Also, the growing
dominance of foreign carriers in the transatlantic charter market
served to reinforce the case for measures tending to strengthen
U. S.-flag competition.
In 1960 the Board instituted the Transatlantic Charter Investi-
gation" to determine whether to certificate charter airlines in the
transatlantic market. The agency also amended its Economic
Regulations so as to permit applicants in the new proceeding to
obtain 180-day exemptions to perform peak-season transatlantic
charters, without the necessity for individual flight authorizations,
the exemptions being terminated not later than September 30 of
any year.
"*Keyes, supra note 1, at 181 and n.37 on the same page.
I Goldklang, supra note 2, at 117.
26 Order E-16023, November 14, 1960.
' Transatlantic Charter Investigation, supra note 15, at 278. The Examiner
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The first such exemptions, issued to eight carriers, were in effect
during the latter part of the summer of 1961. In this year, the
exempted carriers' share of the April-September transatlantic char-
ter passengers rose to 22.1 percent (from 17.2 percent in 1960).
The following year, their share reached 26.3 percent; but by 1963
it had fallen to about the 1961 level. 8 It was not until 1964, when
the first U. S. transatlantic charter airlines were certificated, that
these carriers began to experience the steady rise in traffic and in
market share which produced such spectacular results in the latter
part of the decade.
By 1962, however, the prospect of serious charter-specialist
competition had already modified the IATA fare structure on the
North Atlantic. As early as the fall of 1960, when it had become
evident that the CAB was likely to certificate such competition,
IATA carriers were actively considering introduction of group dis-
counts to meet the threat." The following year brought general
agreement among the airlines that such discounts were desirable,"0
and they were instituted in the spring of 1962. The resulting group
fares have been described as follows:
The group fares, which establish a 38 percent discount on round-
trip economy fares, are applicable to "affinity" and "spontaneous"
groups of 25 or more persons who travel in economy class across
the North Atlantic on a round-trip basis. "Affinity" groups are
those whose members belong to the same association, organization,
company, corporation, or other legal entity which have principal
purposes, aims, and objectives other than travel. Generally speak-
ing, they are the same as those charter groups or organizations
which meet the standards for pro rata charters under parts 295
[governing transatlantic charters by U. S.-flag supplemental and
all-cargo carriers] and 212 [governing charters by foreign air car-
riers]. The "spontaneous" group . . . is defined . . . as any group
pointed out that the revision of the Economic Regulation "was occasioned by the
Board's decision to institute this proceeding and its conclusion that (1) retention
of the power to disapprove individual charter flights was no longer administra-
tively necessary and (2) the economic and administrative burden in obtaining
approval for each flight so handicapped the small carriers as to affect their ability
to operate the services profitably."
21 Transatlantic Supplemental Charter Authority Renewal Case, Examiner's
Recommended Decision, supra note 17, at Appendix 1. Numbers of passengers
accounted for were 37,203, 48,827, and 31,676 in 1961, 1962, and 1963 respec-
tively.
29Aviation Week, October 10, 1960.
"
0 Aviation Week, October 2, 1961.
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of persons which has [not] been publicly solicited (either directly
or indirectly) by the carrier, the travel organizer, a member of
the travel group, an agent, or representative of any of them. 1
At this time, the "spontaneous" group was also eligible for trans-
atlantic charters under IATA Resolution 045, however, such groups
were shortly to be dropped from both the charter and the group
fare categories.
The Board's decision recommending certification of supplemental
airlines as charter specialists on the North Atlantic for a five-year
period was sent to the President in October 1963."' In this opinion,
the Board emphasized the inadequacy of the IATA group fares as
a substitute for charters in meeting the demand for low-cost, peak-
season passage. The group fares were, it was pointed out, about
$55 higher than pro rata charters, and not available for weekend
travel during peak periods. Also, they were not offered to or from
U. S. points other than New York and Boston.' Moreover, said
the Board, the group fares were "in some measure at least, instigated
by the availability of transatlantic charters by part 295 carriers,
and their continuation is dependent upon the concerted action of
the IATA carriers." ' Thus the Board expected certification of
charter specialists to serve a twofold purpose: to "provide a stim-
ulus to the IATA carriers to develop a fare structure directed at
developing a mass market," and to "help to assure the continued
provision of low-cost air transportation in the seasonal transatlantic
market, whatever course individually ticketed fares should take."'
"' Transatlantic Charter Investigation, supra note 15, at 289 (emphasis added).
To clarify this concept, the IATA issued a memorandum containing the following
definition of a "spontaneous group": " . . . a group formed when all the persons
of which it is composed are assembled for purposes excluding that of the forma-
tion of a travel group. Its formation," the memorandum continued, "must not
have been referred to previously in writing of any kind, including personal notes
or letters. It must not have resulted in whole or in part from solicitation by
telephone, from oral solicitation, other than that directed simultaneously to the
persons assembled for purposes excluding that of the formation of a travel group,
or from use of any other media of public communications, including public ad-
dress systems, radio, telegraph, or television." Aviation Week, April 16, 1962.
3 Transatlantic Charter Investigation, supra note 15. The Board originally
recommended certification of three carriers: Capitol Airways, Inc., Saturn Air-
ways, Inc., and Overseas National Airways, Inc. The President approved certifica-
tion of the first two, but directed that the Board reconsider the "fitness" of the
third.
3 Id. at 253-54.
34 Id. at 255.
85 Id.
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By the same decision, the market available to the supplementals
was broadened by allowing them to offer "split" charters-i.e., two
charter groups on the same aircraft, removing the maximum mem-
bership limit on charter-eligible organizations,' and relaxing some-
what the regulations restricting activities of travel agents in con-
nection with charters. ' The split charter authorization was in-
tended to adapt the charter rules to the advent of larger aircraft,
which were already producing a strain on the ability of small or-
ganizations to scrape up a planeload lot. A 40-person minimum
was, however, imposed for each charter group; this limit, it was
pointed out, would serve to moderate the impact on IATA group
traffic (with its 25-person minimum). The number of charter
groups permitted per aircraft was increased later to three, and in
1971 the limit on number of groups was removed; however, the
40-person group minimum was retained."'
On the other hand, a proposal to allow the supplementals to
offer all-expense tour charters was at this time rejected as threaten-
ing to divert too much traffic from the scheduled airlines. Such
tours had historically made up an important part of the trans-
atlantic traffic carried by Pan American and TWA, and it was
thought that travel agents, if permitted to charter aircraft on their
own account in connection with these tours, would promote their
"0Testifying before the Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce
Committee, Board Chairman Secor D. Browne described the evolution of the
maximum size rule: "In the area of charter rules, [the Board] originally limited
the size of charter groups to 5,000-10,000 members, depending on the geograph-
ical extent of the membership. The allowable size of the group was raised to a
flat 15,000 in 1960. In 1961 the group size was raised to 20,000. And finally in
1964 all numerical limitations were removed." Quoted in the dissenting opinion
of Vice Chairman Whitney Gilliland, Regulation SPR-61, September 27, 1972
at 1.
3' Commenting on these provisions, the Board said: 'The restrictions on travel
agents which are sought to be eliminated, viz., assisting in the formation of char-
ter groups, handling the sale of air transportation to members of the group, en-
gaging in the administration of a charter flight and soliciting individuals for land
tours, as well as receiving any commissions for a charter flight or land tour
if the agent is a member of the chartering organization would . . . appear to
have little, if any, merit in the future regulation of transatlantic charters." These
regulations, the agency pointed out, were adopted in an effort to control early
violations of eligibility standards by irregular air carriers and their agents; such
violations, it was expected, would not occur under the new regime of certification
and strict carrier accountability. Transatlantic Charter Investigation, note 15 supra
at 320.
81 Testimony of Chairman Browne, supra note 36.
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own packages to the disadvantage of tours offered by scheduled
carriers." This position, however, was soon to be abandoned.
In addition to services provided by the two certificated supple-
mentals, temporary authority to conduct transatlantic charter oper-
ations was granted to four additional supplementals for the sum-
mer of 1965, ' and to the same number for the summer of 1966.'
In September 1966 the President approved certification of the
latter four for a period expiring at the same time as the certificates
of the two already authorized (i.e., until April 1969).' All six were
authorized to perform inclusive tour charters for tour operators."'
Buoyant traffic growth, general airline prosperity, and continuing
foreign dominance of the transatlantic charter market were the
leading factors behind these actions. Also important were the in-
adequate quantity and quality of the service being offered by the
incumbent supplemental carriers. The examiner's recommended
decision, adopted in substance by the Board, sets forth the general
background as follows:
Since the last hearing, the results of scheduled air carrier operations
in the transatlantic market have changed from marginal to highly
profitable; there has been failure of the group fare program of the
scheduled carriers to meet the needs of travelers who would use
charter service; the foreign air carriers have increased the extent
of their dominance of the transatlantic charter market; the total
traffic using that market has more than doubled in volume; the
predominant proportion of its travelers have come to demand jet
aircraft and to reject piston equipment for this transportation; but
the market's development in traffic volume has been limited by
the quality and volume of service offered. '
'The Board's authority to permit split charters was unsuccessfully challenged
in the courts. Supplemental Air Service Proceeding, Order E-23350 (1966) at 4.
40ld., Examiner's Recommended Decision, 10 at n.22. The carriers were
World Airways, Trans International Airlines, Inc., American Flyers Airline Corp.,
and Modern Air Transport, Inc.
41 Annual Report, 1966 at 27: " . . . the CAB recognized the temporary
need for additional charter capacity in the transatlantic market during the sum-
mer of 1966, and granted temporary authority to four supplementals (American
Flyers Airline Corp., Overseas National Airways, Trans International Airlines,
and World Airways) to engage in such operations. The authority . . . expires
September 30, 1966."
4 2Reopened Transatlantic Charter Investigation, Order E-24242 (1966).
43Reopened Transatlantic Charter Investigation (All-Expense Tour Phase),
Orders E-24240 and E-24241 (1966).
"Reopened Transatlantic Charter Investigation, supra note 42, Examiner's
Recommended Decision, at 3. On the last point, the decision noted at 9: "During
19731
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There had been "a limited and decreasing use of the group fares"
offered by the scheduled carriers,' and individual 14-21 day ex-
cursion fares appeared to be an equally inadequate substitute for
charters in the tourist market." Relative levels of scheduled and
charter fares were compared as follows:
COMPARISON OF RATES CHARGED BY PAN AMERICAN
AND TWA WITH TRANS-INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES' RATES47
New York-Paris Market
Fare per revenue
Class of service Round-trip fare passenger-mile
PAN AMERICAN AND TWA
First class $754.30 10.38c
Peak economy 526.30 7.24
Off-peak economy 440.80 6.06
21-day excursion 341.80 4.70
TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRPLANES
1965 peak-season
pro rata charter 274.38 3.77
The growing need of the supplementals to decrease their depend-
ence on military contracts and the relative unimportance of charter
traffic to U. S.-flag scheduled airlines" were also adduced in sup-
port of the additional certifications.
The Board's previous refusal to authorize inclusive tour charters
(ITC's) by the supplementals, as has been noted, had resulted
the period between December 1, 1964, and March 15, 1965, Capitol received
94 inquiries for 1965 transatlantic charters (65 of jet equipment and 29 for
piston) on which it could not make quotations because of unavailability of the
type of aircraft desired on the date desired . . . a review of [Saturn's] files prior
to June 1, 1965, showed 13 requests for which aircraft were not available. Pan
American received 195 inquiries between January 1 and May 18, 1965 for 1965
transatlantic charters which were refused due to inability to commit equipment."
'" "Pan American carried 14,321 group fare passengers in 1962, 27,921 in
1963, 12,664 in 1964, and 6,048 in the first 8 months of 1965." Id. at 11.
46 Typical of these fares, the examiner noted, were "those between New York
and London of $300 and between New York and Paris of $341;" they were not
applicable on weekends (the most popular time for charter flights); permitted
too short a stay; and were furthermore "unavailable eastbound June 11 through
July 11, August 6 through August 29, and November 5 through February 15.
Westbound," the decision continued, "they are unavailable June 4 through June
27, August 20 through September 12, and November 5 through February 15."
Id. at 11-12.
47 Supra note 42, at Appendix 11.
4
,Supra note 42, at 11.
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from a belief that excessive traffic would otherwise be diverted
from the scheduled airlines. In 1966, however, there had been a
sharp improvement in the finances of these carriers. Moreover, it
was anticipated that diversion would be minimized because the
spread between scheduled and supplemental tour prices had nar-
rowed. Thus, according to the then Board Chairman John H.
Crooker, the Board believed that the new authority "(1) would
meet a substantial public need for low-cost pleasure air travel, (2)
would provide an additional source of revenue to strengthen the
supplemental air carriers, and (3) would not have any real adverse
effect on the certificated route carriers." 9 To reduce the possibility
of excessive diversion further, several very restrictive conditions
were laid down:
... the tour price paid by members of the public cannot be less
than 110 percent of the lowest available individual air fare offered
by a scheduled carrier for transportation over the same route. The
price of the tour must include at least all hotel accommodations
and air and surface transportation between all places on the
itinerary. Each tour must be performed on a round-trip basis, last
at least seven days, and have a minimum of three overnight stops
at least 50 miles apart. Such a tour may be operated only by a
regulated tour operator, pursuant to prior approval by the Board
of the tour prospectus. Prior to approval of a prospectus, sched-
uled carriers serving the points involved in the tour must be given
notice of the tour operator's application and an opportunity to
object. .. "
This action had a decided influence on the fares agreed upon by
IATA members in the winter of 1966. A new group inclusive tour-
basing fare, which on the New York-London route came to $230,
was characterized by Chairman Crooker as "the lowest fare ever
charged for scheduled service in the history of North Atlantic air
travel, '.1 and special affinity group fares adopted at this time seem
" Supplemental Air Transportation, Hearings before the Aviation Subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Commerce, U. S. Senate, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., on
S. 3566 (1968), at 9.
"I Id. at 9-10. The Board's authority to permit inclusive tour charters by sup-
plementals was challenged in the courts. After the Supreme Court had split 4-4
on the question (Aviation Week, July 8, 1968), new legislation was passed which
confirmed the agency's authority (Aviation Week, Oct. 7, 1968).
"Supplemental Air Transportation, supra note 49 at 10.
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also to have been aimed at passengers who might otherwise have
patronized the charter airlines."2
Further IATA attempts to capture the low-cost travel market
occurred in 1969. Though some of the fares seemingly most com-
petitive with the supplementals and most strenuously opposed by
them apparently were not successful and were subsequently aban-
doned, " there was an important impact on the level and avail-
ability of excursion fares. Thus, the 14-21 day excursion interval
was extended to 14-28 days, and a new 29-45 day excursion was
introduced at $295, $265, and $250 in the peak, shoulder, and
"Describing in general the changes in North Atlantic fares, Aviation Week,
Dec. 26, 1966, noted: "Four special fares were added to the six regular and
special fares now in effect. The new fares include:
Group inclusive tour fare. Conditions call for a group minimum of 15 persons
but no affinity is required. Tickets are valid for a maximum of 21 days, but
ticket holders may not return to point of embarkation before 14 days from the
time of departure....
Basic round-trip fare is $230 New York-London except during the summer
periods when the regular excursion fare is not available. . . . A minimum of
$70 must be added to all group inclusive tour fares for land arrangements such
as hotels and sightseeing to bring the basic inclusive tour fare equal to the $300
round-trip 21-day excursion rate. Airlines may sell them as well as travel
agents ...
Winter affinity group fare. This fare calls for a minimum group of 15 persons
on westbound flights and 25 persons on eastbound flights. New York-London
fare will be $267 and will be effective only in winter months....
Large affinity group fare. Available during the summer season, this fare calls
for a minimum affinity group of 50 passengers and has been set at $245 round-
trip New York-London.
Very large affinity group fare. Minimum group is set at 70 passengers. It is
good only New York-Lisbon at $215 round-trip and New York-Madrid at $225
round-trip. It is available all year."
33 The fares abandoned after a one-season trial included the so-called "con-
tract bulk inclusive tour" (CBIT) fare, which the board had tried to block be-
cause of its expected adverse effect on the supplementals, and which was approved
only after a prolonged confrontation with the IATA carriers; see Aviation Week,
October 27, 1969; November 10, 1969; October 12, 1970; November 23, 1970.
In the Examiner's Recommended Decision in the Transatlantic Supplemental
Charter Authority Renewal Case, supra note 17, the fare is described (at 27-28):
"The CBIT fare is a new concept that involves the sale of a block of seats (at
least 40 eastbound and 20 westbound) to a tour operator at prices which vary
according to the time of year and which are lower than any fares ever offered in
scheduled service on the Atlantic. The tour operator resells these seats to the
public along with a required land tour at a fixed minimum price per person of
$100.00 for the first 14 days plus $7.00 for each day over 14. The fares have
a 14-21 day restriction. Three stopovers, including the turnaround point, are per-
mitted. The carriers may not allow commissions to the tour operators and the
operator must make a 10 percent nonrefundable deposit with the carrier three
months before departure and make full payment a month in advance. The in-
dividual fares available to the tour operators for New York-London are $220
peak season, $190 shoulder and $175 off-season."
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off seasons respectively, New York-London. (In this market, the
regular off-season excursion rate was $300.)"
Further special fare initiatives occurred in 1971. Probably be-
cause of the particular success of the charter carriers in the youth
travel market," several European carriers proposed to offer dras-
tically reduced fares for youths and/or students (for example, $199
New York-Rome, round trip)." Since these fares had been ordered
into effect by the carriers' home governments, they would not be
considered as violations of the IATA fare agreements. The Board
was able to block these actions temporarily by resorting to the
courts;"7 however, a last minute fare package agreed on in Decem-
ber included youth fares (at a higher level than the 1971 pro-
posals)" and other reduced promotional fares."
As a result of the youth fare episode, and of a fare proposal
which was insisted upon by Lufthansa until the eleventh hour
before agreement was reached, and which the U. S. scheduled air.
lines considered "hopelessly uneconomic," the Board appealed
urgently to Congress for legislation empowering it to set rates in
international air transportation."0 There had been severe disagree-
ment among the carriers concerning the best way to meet charter
competition, and the especially drastic proposals made by Lufthansa
apparently resulted from its special vulnerability to charter in-
roads."' In the spring of 1972 the CAB was granted power to
" Transatlantic Supplemental Charter Authority Renewal Case, Examiner's
Recommended Decision, supra note 17, at 27.
15 In this connection, a spokesman for Trans International Airlines remarked,
"There is no reason to have a lower youth fare, except that youths have been
flying on supplementals." Aviation Week, July 19, 1971.
"6Aviation Week, June 14, 1971.
"Aviation Week, June 28, 1971.
" Wall Street Journal, March 6, 1972.
59 E.g., a 22-45 day excursion to replace the old 29-45 day fare, at a cost of
$204, $224 and $294 for off, shoulder, and peak seasons, and a new winter group
inclusive tour fare for a minimum of ten passengers, for a 7-8 day period, for
$204. IATA sources estimated that as a result of these reductions the carriers
would have to increase their load factors by 20 to 30 percent to "maintain the
3 percent return on investment they recorded in 1970." Aviation Week, Decem-
ber 20, 1971.
"°Aviation Week, September 20, 1971; November 22, 1971.
61 The Economist, November 6, 1971: "All of [the international airlines] agree
that fares have to be cut, in order to compete with the charter airlines .... They
do not dispute that this means offering a return ticket for around £80 London
to New York. . . .They disagree fundamentally . .. on what form this ticket
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suspend these rates for a maximum of one year, subject to Presi-
dential ability to stay, approve, or disapprove the Board's findings.'
It would evidently have been unreasonable to expect an agency of
the U. S. government unilaterally to dictate prices charged by car-
riers of foreign nationality.
Meanwhile, IATA carriers were expanding their efforts to meet
charter competition on its own ground. Comparing 1971 with
1970, there was a 29.7 percent increase in one-way passengers
carried by IATA charters on the North Atlantic, whereas the
comparable increase for IATA scheduled traffic was only 4.1 per-
cent.6" During the first half of 1972, IATA charter traffic was about
29 percent above the level for the first six months of 1971."
III. EXPANSION OF CHARTER TRAFFIC AND RENEWAL
OF CERTIFICATES
When certificating supplemental charter competition on the
North Atlantic, the Board had announced two major objectives-
"to provide a stimulus to the IATA carriers to develop a fare
structure directed at developing a mass market and to assure the
provision of low cost transportation in the seasonal transatlantic
market. ' In very large part as a result of the activities of U. S.
supplementals and, to a lesser extent, of the foreign charter airlines
which entered transatlantic service in their wake," low-cost travel
over the Atlantic underwent a truly impressive expansion.
should take .... It will be cheaper at some times of the year to buy two of
Lufthansa's [proposed] 14-day excursion tickets and throw away the return halves
than it would be to buy an ordinary round trip at the standard fare .... But as
charter airlines are already taking 40 per cent of the traffic between Germany
and North America anyway, Lufthansa's losses are likely to be smaller under
its own new scheme than they would be without it."
6 Wall Street Journal, March 6, 1972.
63Aviation Week, May 15, 1972.
64Aviation Week, October 16, 1972.
' Transatlantic Supplemental Charter Authority Renewal Case, Examiner's
Recommended Decision, supra note 17, at 16.
" The first foreign charter airline permit was granted to Caledonian Airways
(Prestwick) Ltd. in 1963 for a three-year period. At this time the Board estab-
lished a policy of limiting U. S.-originating flights by these carriers to a number
bearing a 4-3 ratio to the carrier's home-originating flights, with certain minor
limiting provisos. By February, 1972, transatlantic authority had been granted
to twenty-three European charter carriers, and six additional applications for
charter permits were pending before the Board, as well as one request for re-
newal of a permit. Aviation Week, February 14, 1972.
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In 1963, charter traffic on the North Atlantic amounted to about
500,000 one-way passengers, or 16 percent of the total traffic of
just under 3 million. Of this 16 percent, 14 was carried by IATA
members and only 2 by non-members. By 1971, the market share
of the charter traffic had doubled; at 32 percent of a greatly ex-
panded total (about 11 million one-way passengers), charter traffic
stood at about 3.5 million. Though IATA charter traffic had greatly
increased in absolute volume, the increased charter share was ac-
counted for entirely by non-IATA traffic. Of the 32 percent total
charter market share, 22 was accounted for by non-IATA carriers
and only 10 by IATA members. 7 Though there is room for argu-
ment about the extent to which charter traffic would have moved
by regularly scheduled flights had charters not been available, it is
generally agreed that a very large percentage of charter passengers
would not have moved at all;68 and it is evident that the average
fare would have been substantially higher in the absence of charters.
In view of this record, it is not surprising that the Board, in early
1972, recommended renewal of five of the six transatlantic sup-
plemental certificates for an additional five-year period. 9 In ac-
cordance with a Presidential directive, however, the Board three
months later (in April, 1972) issued three-year certificates to all
" Aviation Week, May 15, 1972.
68 On the basis of evidence submitted by scheduled and supplemental carriers,
it has been concluded that: " . . . insofar as the amount of diversion from sched-
uled service flights to charter flights can be deduced from the surveys the per-
centage should be considered as in a range of 30 to 35 percent." Transatlantic
Supplemental Charter Authority Renewal Case, Examiner's Recommended De-
cision, supra note 17, at 22. (The percentage figures refer to the proportion of
charter passengers who would have traveled by scheduled flight if charter service
had not been available.)
19The Board's initial recommendation was made in January, 1972. Though
the original certificates had expired in 1969, they had continued in effect through
temporary extensions pending final decision. See, Memorandum accompanying
letter from Board Chairman Secor Browne to the President, dated March 30,
1972, included with Transatlantic Supplemental Charter Authority Renewal Case,
Order 72-5-9, April 20, 1972: The sixth-American Flyers-was not recommended
for recertification ". . . for essentially two broad reasons . . . First, the carrier
had made a minimal contribution to the development of successful transatlantic
charter services, not having become an effective participant in the market until
after the expiration date of its certificate. Second, in the light of the economic
decline within the supplemental industry in recent years, the Board felt that a
more cautious approach to transatlantic awards was in order, to avoid excessive
fragmentation of Atlantic charter traffic. Therefore, finding no affirmative need
for a sixth U. S. supplemental carrier, the Board continued the five-carrier pat-
tern which, for all practical purposes, had been responsible for developing and
maintaining a healthy U. S.-Europe charter market."
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six of the incumbents. Although accepting-not without pointed
comment'°--the White House revision of its original recommenda-
tions, the Board successfully refused to go along with an additional
Presidential suggestion, i.e., that the agency develop "firm economic
criteria" on the basis of which it could decide "upon the levels of
scheduled and non-scheduled services necessary for the main-
tenance of the public interest,"'" before finally acting upon the
renewal of the transatlantic charter certificates. These "criteria,"
the President indicated, should represent an "interpretation and
elaboration" of a general principle embodied in the Statement of
International Air Transportation Policy of the United States which
had received his approval in June, 1970. In relevant part, the
Statement runs as follows:
Scheduled services are of vital importance to air transportation
and offer services to the public which are not provided by charter
services. Only scheduled services are expected to offer regular
and dependably frequent schedules, provide extensive flexibility
in length of stay, and maintain worldwide routes, including routes
to areas of low traffic volume. Substantial impairment of sched-
uled services could result in travelers and shippers losing the
ability to obtain these benefits. Accordingly, in any instances where
a substantial impairment of scheduled services appears likely, it
would be appropriate, where necessary to avoid prejudice to the
public interest, to take steps to prevent such impairment. '
70In his letter to the President, supra note 69, Chairman Browne said: "
the Board does not question your authority or your decision to require, for reasons
of foreign policy, six-instead of five-U. S. supplemental air carriers over the
North Atlantic." (Emphasis added,) It is generally accepted that the proper pur-
pose of Presidential review of Board decisions affecting international air trans-
portation is to bring about conformity with the foreign policy of the United
States, rather than, say, to revise the Board's economic judgments. In a later letter,
the White House made a point of trying to relate its recommendations to foreign
policy considerations. Letter from the President to Chairman Secor Browne, dated
April 13, 1972, included with Order 72-5-9 (April 20, 1972).
71 Letter from President Nixon to the Chairman of the CAB, dated March
27, 1972, included with Order 72-5-9 (April 20, 1972).
72 Statement of International Air Transportation Policy of the United States,
approved June 22, 1970, at 6 (mimeo). The Statement contains a similar recom-
mendation concerning action to avoid substantial impairment of charter services
(at 6-7): "Charter services by scheduled and supplemental carriers have been
useful in holding down fare and rate levels and expanding passenger and cargo
markets. They offer opportunities to exploit the inherent efficiency of planeload
movement and the elasticity of demand for international air transport. They can
provide low-cost transportation of a sort fitted to the needs of a significant por-
tion of the traveling public. Charter services are a most valuable component of
the international air transportation system, and they should be encouraged. If
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What the Board was apparently being asked to consider was
whether and to what extent curtailment of the supplemental air-
lines' authority was necessary to prevent "substantial impairment"
of scheduled services, and, for this purpose, to determine what
level of scheduled service was required by the public interest. The
agency rejected the suggestion on two grounds: (1) that it had in
fact already found that "the operations of the . . . supplemental
airlines . . . had not 'substantially impaired' scheduled services";
and (2) that the development of "firm economic criteria" was not
only not feasible "in the absence of facts not now present" but also
undesirable because likely to result in governmental capacity re-
strictions.'" In contrast to the Board, the Department of Transpor-
tation appears to have been a strong supporter of the concept of
"firm economic criteria."'
The issue raised here is of basic importance for future regulatory
policy. If, as the Statement of International Air Transportation
Policy indicates, there is to be a firm regulatory limit on competition
between charter and scheduled services, then the idea of determin-
ing a necessary minimum of scheduled service has at least one
outstanding merit: it is surely preferable to the other leading con-
tender for the role of defining "substantial impairment." This
alternative is the well-known principle generally followed by the
Board of examining whether an airline proposal is likely to result
in diverting revenues from other airlines. Here, diversion which
would impair any carrier's ability to conduct its existing level of
operations is considered ipso facto excessive."' Applied to charter
competition with scheduled service, this sort of criterion could
it appears that there is likely to be a substantial impairment of charter services,
it would be appropriate, where necessary to avoid prejudice to the public interest,
to take steps to prevent such impairment." However, it was obviously not this
type of "impairment" that was at issue here.
71 Letter from Chairman Browne, supra note 69.
"'See, for example, Aviation Week, February 21, 1972: "Transportation De-
partment last week reemphasized an earlier position calling for standards that
would set a required level of scheduled frequencies to determine the amount of
such service which should be provided governmental protection. In an address
.. . last week, Robert Henri Binder, Transportation Department acting assistant
secretary for policy and international affairs, expressed concern that the Board
has not seen fit to respond to the proposal. He added that neither the scheduled
nor charter carriers had offered any 'meaningful' suggestions."
5 See L. S. KEYES, FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION
(Harvard, 1951).
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have no justification in terms of minimum essential needs for the
scheduled type of operation.
It was just the traditional sort of criterion that was in fact being
urged upon the Board by the scheduled carriers in the Trans-
atlantic Supplemental Charter Authority Renewal Case.' The
agency did not expressly reject the criterion itself; it refused the
pleas of Pan American and TWA because there had been, in its
opinion, no "persuasive showing that sound and dependable trans-
atlantic scheduled operations are being jeopardized and that their
impairment is primarily, or at least substantially, attributable to
the charter carriers."" The supporting discussion was addressed
primarily to analyzing the causes for heavy losses recently experi-
enced by the two airlines, especially Pan American. Non-competi-
tive factors, particularly "general economic ills" and transition to
new equipment, had evidently been at work." Moreover, "efforts
to demonstrate a direct relationship between the supplementals'
growth and the declining fortunes of the scheduled airlines [were]
further undermined by the highly disparate recent experience of
Pan American and TWA in Atlantic operations."" Because of its
concentration on the reasons behind the financial ills of the sched-
uled airlines, and its failure to examine the question of determining
what minimum level of scheduled service, if any, is actually re-
quired, the Board's decision may be at least tentatively interpreted
as accepting in principle the definition of "substantial impairment"
implied in the arguments of the scheduled carriers.
In fact, there does not appear to be a good case for any regu-
latory limit on the competition between charter and scheduled
76 Transatlantic Supplemental Charter Authority Renewal Case, supra note 69,
at 5-6.
77 Id. at 7.
8 lid. at 7-8.
78 Id. at 12. "Pan American's operating results have slipped steadily since
1966, falling from a profit of nearly $50 million in that year to an operating loss
of almost $30 million (and a $7 million net loss) in 1970. TWA, by contrast,
enjoyed increasing profits each year between 1966 and 1969-a period of tre-
mendous growth in charter traffic-before suffering a relatively poor, though
still profitable, 1970." Id. at 12, n.19: "Pan American's declining fortunes begin-
ning with 1967 coincide with the carrier's introduction of substantial additional
capacity in 1967 and 1968 in an effort to improve its market share. In fact, be-
tween 1966 and 1969 (i.e., before the introduction of B-747's), the carrier in-
creased its transatlantic capacity by nearly 45 percent, while its traffic grew by
only 24 percent."
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services, even if based on predetermined minimum levels of need.
The arguments against regulatory protection, as opposed to direct
subvention, of essential non-self-supporting public services, are by
now well enough known to need no further repetition, and none of
the extenuating circumsatnces which can sometimes be adduced
in support of such protection appears to be applicable here. This
point will be further developed in the final section of this discussion.
At any rate, there seems to be little or no present prospect that
charter competition will reduce scheduled service below any de-
fensible minimum level. The recent expansion of transatlantic
charter traffic (from half a million passengers in 1963 to about 3.5
million in 1971) has been accompanied by a phenomenal rise in
scheduled traffic-from about 2.5 million to 7.5 million for the
same period. The absolute increase in scheduled traffic, at approxi-
mately 5 million, was of course far larger than the absolute increase
in charter traffic."
In spite of recent expansion in capacity and failure of traffic to
grow at a comparable rate, the overall financial picture among
U. S. carriers in the transatlantic market seems not at all bleak.
There are some dark spots, but these appear to be due to factors
affecting particular carriers rather than the group as a whole.
Among the transatlantic supplementals, Universal (merged with
American Flyers in May 1971) continued to lose money and was
forced to suspend operations in May 1971." Others in this group
were keeping their heads for the most part above water; some-
notably World and Trans International-were faring remarkably
well. 2 As has been noted, there was a sharp divergence of fortunes
between the two U. S.-flag scheduled carriers: for 1970 and 1971,
TWA (Atlantic) reported operating profits of $16.1 and $37.1
millions respectively; the corresponding operating losses of Pan
American (Atlantic) were $29.6 and $35.6 millions."
IV. RECENT MOVEs TOWARD LIBERALIZATION
Though the CAB has devoted a great deal of time and effort to
enforcement of restrictive charter rules since 1969 in the face of
80 Aviation Week, May 15, 1972.
"' Aviation Week, October 2, 1972.
"Civil Aeronautics Board, Air Carrier Financial Statistics, December, 1971.
83 Id.
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widespread violations by all types of carriers," the main thrust of
recent U. S. government policy has been overwhelmingly in the
direction of liberalizing the institutional framework of charter trans-
portation. In 1972, U. S. efforts to broaden applicable definitions
of acceptable charters culminated in two actions representing major
breaks with past policy: (i) disapproval of IATA Resolution 045,
which sets standards for charters operated by IATA members; and
(ii) issuance of an economic regulation providing for "Travel
Group Charters" to be operated by both U. S. scheduled and U. S.
supplemental airlines. Another principal endeavor with the same
general aim has been an effort to put an end to--or at least to
reduce-governmental obstruction of charter airline operations by
refusal or limitation of landing rights. The hope has been that this
objective could be accomplished through bilateral or multilateral
agreements arranging for mutual exchange of landing rights on a
basis similar to that now provided for scheduled services under the
Bermuda-type bilaterals. So far, however, this initiative has not
been successful.
A. Disapproval of Resolution 045
Originally adopted by IATA in 1953, Resolution 045 provides
that JATA member airlines may make charter agreements "with
only one person ...for his own use" or "on behalf of a group,
whose principal aims, purposes, and objectives are other than travel
and where the group has sufficient affinity existing prior to the
application for charter transportation to distinguish it and set it
apart from the general public .... "n Mindful of the patent impre-
cision of this definition, the chairman of the adopting traffic con-
ference offered the hopeful prediction that "we will eventually find
the elusive words to describe what we all know we mean" on the
"basis of information on the type of traffic actually carried on
charters."8 In the early years, as has been noted, the Resolution,
in accordance with the wishes of the CAB, also permitted charter
agreements with so-called "spontaneous groups."8
14 See, for example, Aviation Week, June 23, 1969; November 24, 1969; March
30, 1970; July 6, 1970; September 6, 1971, p. 26; Washington Post, March 22,
1972; Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1972.
85 Foreign Off-Route Charter Service Investigation, 27 CAB 196, 202 at n.7
(1958).
88 IATA Bulletin 1954, p. 79.
87 The Board held that "the better method of control is over the means of
1973] TRANSLANTIC CHARTER POLICY
Both Resolution 045 and the Board's regulation governing
transatlantic charters, which generally conforms to the Resolution,
have contained more detailed requirements concerning charter
eligibility than does the regulation governing domestic charters.
The two sets of international standards have not, however, been
identical. For example, since 1964 the Board has set no maximum
on the membership of charter worthy organizations,88 whereas
Resolution 045 has maintained such a maximum. The latest ver-
sion of the Resolution, disapproved by the Board, would have
raised the maximum from "20,000 members to 50,000 members
except with respect to charters originating in Scandinavia, which
would remain at 20,000 members."88
Dissatisfaction with divergencies between U. S. and IATA stand-
ards was one consideration adduced by the Board in its show-cause
order, issued in March 1972 presaging ultimate disapproval of the
Resolution." Both here and in the final disapproval order, it was
pointed out that these discrepancies resulted in an unfair com-
petitive disadvantage for carriers not in a position to circumvent
more restrictive IATA rules by the formation of non-member
charter subsidiaries (a path which was open to foreign, but not to
U. S., carriers)." Secondly, the Board noted that U. S. charter
solicitation rather than the character of the group," although it conceded that "in
determining whether the individuals to be carried were ... solicited from the
general public, it may be appropriate to examine: (1) the aims, purposes, and
objectives of the group; and (2) the affinity of the group prior to the application
for charter transportation-facts which may reflect on the propriety of the char-
ter." Foreign Of-Route Charter Investigation, supra note 85 at 229. The agency's
"refusal to limit charters to prior-affinity groups has stemmed from two consid-
erations. First, the prior-affinity test has definite discriminatory aspects.... Second,
the test, which is efficacious as a means of restricting the transportation to bona
fide charters when applied to relatively small and closely knit groups, becomes
largely meaningless when applied to organizations whose membership is nation-
wide, or to organizations having only nominal membership requirements." Id.
at 202 n.8.
11 Testimony of Chairman Secor Browne before the Aviation Subcommittee
of the Senate Commerce Committee, quoted in the dissent of Vice Chairman
Whitney Gillilland, at 1 n.1, Regulation SPR-61, supra note 36.
89 Order 72-3-112, March 31, 1972.
90 Id.
11 Id. at 2: "The IATA agreement is in some respects more restrictive than
the Board's rules, and in other respects more liberal. To the extent the IATA
Resolution is more restrictive than the Board's rules, it prevents the public from
taking advantage of charter services to the same extent as the Board has found
to be required in the public interest, and limits the IATA carriers in their com-
petition for the mass air transportation market. To the extent the IATA carriers
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operations had been restricted by many foreign governments "solely
because the proposed operations, which would not otherwise be
considered to be contrary to the public interest, did not conform
to the IATA requirements.
9
M
Of greater significance, however, was the Board's assertion that
"the time has come to recognize new concepts of charter air trans-
portation" and that "charter regulations should be framed in a
manner which will promote rather than inhibit the public demand
for bulk air transportation." Citing the recent "tremendous growth"
in the charter market, despite IATA and governmental restrictions,
as evidence of "a vast and increasing public demand for low cost
mass air transportation," the Board noted that not only in the
United States but also in many European countries, "non-affinity
charter concepts are evolving." In contrast to these new concepts,
Resolution 045 was seen as aimed "not at insuring that charter
operations will be provided on an economic basis, and that the
necessary distinction between scheduled and charter service be
maintained, but rather to the objective and with the effect of im-
posing restrictions which insure that the scheduled carriers will not
depart from their historical role of treating charters only as inci-
dental to their scheduled services.""
As an alternative approach, the Board suggested that the IATA
carriers might want to consider "agreement that a flight will be
considered a charter [and thus, of course, exempt from the IATA
fare agreements] if it conforms to the laws and regulations of the
country in which it originates. Such an agreement," the Board con-
tinued, "unless significantly encumbered by government reserva-
tions, would afford IATA a simple, workable, and equitable regime
to assure uniformity of practice by its members within each and
every point-to-point market. '' "
have agreed to rules that are more liberal than the Board's rules, the Board has
historically conditioned its approval of the Resolution to preclude such opera-
tions in air transportation [to and from the U. S.]. . . . We note that certain
IATA carriers appear to be so disenchanted with their Charter Resolution as
to set up subsidiaries to engage in charter operations, thus, in effect, circumvent-
ing the requirements of 045." Limitations applying to IATA members but not
to their charter subsidiaries include an exclusion of the former type of carrier
from offering split or inclusive tour charters.
92 Order 72-6-91 (June 21, 1972), p. 5.
91 Id. at 4.
94 Id. at 5-6.
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B. Adoption of non-affinity charter regulations
Before the IATA response to the Board's action had material-
ized, both the United States and the United Kingdom had adopted
greatly liberalized, non-affinity charter regulations, applicable to
both scheduled and charter airlines, and the latter country had
authorized a no-reservation scheduled service by a non-IATA
British airline at unprecedentedly low fares.
The Board had announced that it was considering the new non-
affinity charter category in January 1971." The basic reason for
the Board's action, as the agency itself acknowledged, was the
"ever-increasing demand for low-cost charter travel by members
of the public who simply do not share the kind of 'affinity' required
by . . . existing rules.""0 Related to this demand were "(1) the
Board's growing concern that [its] existing rules, limiting charter
travel to groups having a 'prior affinity,' tended to discriminate
against members of the public who did not belong to qualified
organizations with a membership large enough to successfully
mount a charter program; and (2) the fact that [its] existing rules
had proven to be extremely difficult to enforce."" In short, it was
the "irresistible and understandable public demand for low-cost
air transportation, much of it on charter services" which had there-
tofore "been met all too often by flouting existing charter rules""8
which led the Board to abandon the long-standing attempt to
restrict availability of charter services to an essentially arbitrarily
selected segment of the traveling public.
Effective September 27, 1972, for an experimental period
through December 31, 1975, the new Travel Group Charter regu-
lation permits "any group of 40 or more persons to be formed for
the purpose of chartering all or part of an airplane providing that
the charter and charter organizer comply with prescribed condi-
tions." These include the following:
(i) The members of the group must share equally in the cost of
charter.
(ii) The charter must be round trip and for a minimum period of
'Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-Making SPDR-22, January 29, 1971.
N Regulation SPR-61, September 27, 1972, pp. 1-2.
:
7 1d. at 1.
8 Civil Aeronautics Board Press Release, September 27, 1972, p. 1.
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10 days, in most of the world, or at least 7 days within North
America.
(iii) The participants must sign charter contracts and pay at least
a 25 percent nonrefundable deposit early enough to enable the
TGC papers to be filed with the Board no later than three
months before the scheduled flight departure.
(iv) The organizer must safeguard the participants' payments
through bonding or escrow arrangements with a bank.
(v) Only persons whose names are included in the papers filed
with the Board at least three months prior to departure will be
permitted to fly with the TGC group. At least 80 per cent of
the TGC passengers must be persons who signed up as definite
participants, rather than persons who had signed up on a stand-
by basis."
Unanimous opposition on the other side of the Atlantic could,
of course, have frustrated the U. S. attempt to liberalize charter
regulation in the transatlantic market. Shortly after the adoption
of the TGC regulation, however, an essentially similar change in
policy was announced in the United Kingdom. Formulated by the
British Civil Aviation Authority, and to be effective April 1, 1973,
the British plan, like the U. S. proposal, stipulates 90-day advance
booking; however, the group minimum is set at 50 instead of 40,
and there is a 14-day minimum stay requirement. Under the British
regulation, no advance deposit would necessarily be made by pas-
sengers, although travel agents could require it, and part charters
would be permitted on scheduled flights. The CAB does not allow
part charters. In mid-December, ECAC bowed to the inevitable
and assented in principle to the concept of advance reservation,
non-affinity charter flights under rules representing a compromise
between the British and U.S. proposals."' Though there is still the
possibility that these flights will be limited by obstacles such as
quotas set by individual nations, widespread acceptance of trans-
atlantic travel group charters is expected in 1973.
Even before announcement of the new charter regulation, the
British Civil Aviation Authority had approved a proposal by Laker
Airways (a British charter carrier) to offer a so-called "Skytrain"
service-with no advance reservations-between New York and
London on a daily basis at one-way fares of $92.50 in summer and
9 d. at 1-2.
"'Aviation Week, December 18, 1972.
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$81.25 in winter, with meals available on the plane at a modest
additional cost. To minimize last minute diversion from scheduled
flights, the Skytrain was permitted to depart only from Stansted
Airport, 35 miles northeast of London; and to minimize winter
diversion, from October 31 to March 31 the Skytrain was limited
to a daily capacity equivalent to one Boeing 707.
This action followed immediately an address by Prime Minister
Heath at the IATA Annual General Meeting, being held in London
at this fateful time, in which he came out firmly for "simple and
inexpensive" air transportation, if not by IATA carriers, then by
others. "Scheduled services," said the Prime Minister, "will no
doubt continue to serve the needs of those who require the facility
of on-demand and flexible booking arrangements, but there already
are many who do not require this expensive facility and who do not
see why they should pay the added cost.' ' .1 His speech served to
dramatize the contrast between the British government's present
attitude and its opposition to fare reductions on the Atlantic in
earlier years.'"
At the same time, the U. S. supplemental Trans International
filed a tariff offering daily "Sky Bus" service, New York-London,
year-round, at a fare of $75 one way. In support of its proposal,
TIA reportedly "told the CAB that it was only 'fair and logical'
that supplementals should be allowed to conduct scheduled serv-
ices because the scheduled airlines have invaded the charter field
'in a major way'."'' °3 Shortly afterward, British Caledonian (a
charter carrier) put forward a plan for a transatlantic standby serv-
ice at similarly low fares, together with additional fare reductions
for advance reservations by groups and individuals.'"
C. Efforts to regularize charter landing rights
Charter landing rights are not governed by the bilateral agree-
ments covering scheduled services between nations. As a conse-
quence, charter carriers have been to an unusual degree at the
mercy of protectionist and discriminatory national policies. In
May 1972 Aviation Week described some of the applicable restric-
tions as follows:
10' Aviation Week, October 2, 1972.
'0 Keyes, supra note 1, at 179-83.
" Aviation Week, October 2, 1972.
'Aviation Week, October 9, 1972.
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(i) Ban on all charters. Israel prohibits operation of all charter
flights between the U. S. and Israel. Belgium bars any U. S.
supplemental charters between Belgium and any point within
a 300-mile radius of New York.
(ii) Ban on inclusive tour charters. Denmark, Italy, Norway,
Sweden, Japan, Finland and Bermuda refuse such charters to
and from the U. S.
(iii) Ban on split charters. Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden,
Japan, Bermuda, France, Spain, and West Germany exclude
split charters from the U. S.
(iv) Prior approval. Only Argentina and the Bahamas do not re-
quire prior approval for charter flights by U. S. supplemental
and scheduled carriers.
(v) Quotas. Britain, France and Germany impose annual limits
on the number of inclusive tour flights that may be operated to
and from the U. S.'"
As early as 1966 both the CAB and the State Department had
become seriously concerned with this sort of obstacle to U. S.
charter operations, and were studying means of overcoming them.'"
Attention has been devoted to formulation of intergovernmental
agreements, which would regularize the rights of charter services
without sacrificing existing rights now possessed by the scheduled
airlines. On this point, the 1970 Statement of International Air
Transportation Policy had this to say:
The foreign landing rights for charter services should be regularized,
as free as possible from substantial restriction. To accomplish this,
intergovernmental agreements covering the operation of charter
services should be vigorously sought, distinct, however, from
agreements covering scheduled services. In general, there should
be no trade-offs as between scheduled service rights and charter
service rights. In negotiating charter agreements, the continuation
of and the nature of the charter rights of foreign carriers will be
at issue." '
As embodied in a draft being circulated in the fall of 1970, the
U. S. proposal would provide that there be no prior restriction on
charter fares, capacity, or multiple designation of carriers, although
action, after consultation, on the first two would be permitted."
0 Aviation Week, May 29, 1972.
106Aviation Week, October 10, 1966.
'o7 Supra note 72, at 8.
108 Aviation Week, November 2, 1970.
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Response from foreign governments has been uniformly cool; how-
ever, in the fall of 1972 representatives of the Departments of
State and Transportation were conferring with representatives of
the European Civil Aviation Conference and the Canadian Gov-
ernment with the hope of establishing a uniform charter policy."9
The CAB, not participating in these talks, held to the opinion that
a bilateral approach would be more fruitful, because less subject to
total obstruction by the restrictive attitudes of one or a few gov-
ernments.11
V. CONCLUSION
The two major questions which arise from a consideration of
the history of transatlantic charter policy are these: (1) How has
it been possible for a large segment of the most important market
for international air travel to be brought under an essentially com-
petitive regime in spite of general support by concerned govern-
ments of tight IATA controls? (2) How can this essentially com-
petitive regime be defended against what appear to be threats to
its continuation in the future? These two questions will be taken
up in turn.
A. How Charter Competition Succeeded
In view of the adamant insistence of European governments on
strict control of competition in international air transportation in
the post-World War II period, and of the enormous amount of
time, money and energy devoted to price-fixing and enforcement
of agreements by the IATA, it is remarkable indeed that charter
services should have succeeded in escaping from IATA control
and bringing such a large segment of the transatlantic traffic into
an essentially competitive market. How was it that IATA charter
fares were not set by the usual process of agreement? And why
was the uncontrolled market sector allowed to assume such major
dimensions?
Very early in the game (1951), the Civil Aeronautics Board
urged that IATA adopt minimum agreed charter fares," ' and the
possibility was considered by that organization."' At that time,
109 Aviation Week, October 2, 1972.
" Aviation Week, May 15, 1972.
" Goldklang, supra note 2, at 106 n.70.
'
1 1IATA Bulletin, 1951 at 83.
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charter traffic was of minor importance, and no action was taken.
It was always evident that the desirability of setting charter fares,
from the point of view of the IATA carriers, would depend on
whether or not governments could be persuaded to make these
minima effective vis-a-vis non-IATA carriers or to keep such car-
riers out of the market. If they could not, then the obvious result
of IATA price-fixing would be to put member carriers at a com-
petitive disadvantage. From at least 1960 on, U. S. official support
for the supplemental carriers had devloped to such an extent that
it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to secure the
cooperation of this government in either subjecting the supple-
mentas to the IATA price regime or excluding them from inter-
national markets. Indeed, as has been seen, a moderating influence
on IATA pricing was one of the expected benefits which motivated
the decision to certificate the supplementals on the North Atlantic.11
At present, the U. S. government is firmly committed to freely
determined charter rates."" Under the circumstances, the IATA
members were better off without charter rate agreements.
Essentially the same explanation seems to apply to the failure of
the IATA carriers to contain the expansion of charter traffic in
the 'sixties. To do this, governmental cooperation would have been
essential. As the decade wore on, the supporting attitude of the
U. S. government was reinforced by the realization by foreign
governments that a mass travel market-with important financial
benefits for tourist-attracting countries-was developing between
the U. S. and Europe. It was largely the initiative of the charter
airlines which revealed the existence of the "irresistible and under-
standable public demand for low-cost air transportation""' 5 which
has ultimately led not only the U. S. but also the United Kingdom
to abandon the attempt to limit such transportation by arbitrary
rules. There is no doubt that there would have been far stronger
resistance to charter expansion, however, if general economic con-
"'In April, 1963, President Kennedy approved a Statement on International
Air Transport Policy which recommended "continued United States support of
practicable means which help to achieve reasonable rates, such as charter serv-
ices." 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 76, 79 (1964).
"'The Statement of International Air Transportation Policy approved by
President Nixon on June 22, 1970, recommends that "Continued support should
• . .be given to the establishment of IATA and non-IATA charter rates on a
free competitive basis." Supra note 72, at 10.
" Press Release, supra note 98, at 1.
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ditions had been less favorable and there had been an accompany-
ing drop-off in scheduled traffic. What the ultimate outcome would
have been in this case, it is impossible to say.
B. Possible Future Restrictive Policy
It is possible to criticize the more liberal, new charter policy on
the ground that even the new, looser rules are not really necessary
in order to assure that charter flights represent truly low-cost trans-
portation-that is, transportation which can be offered at a low
figure because of the genuine economies inherent in the high load
factors typical of charters. It seems probable that this policy will
represent no serious obstacle in the way of full development of the
charter market potential. Nevertheless, if the principles set forth
in the 1970 Statement of International Air Transportation Policy
actually guide future U. S. actions, such obstacles may at some
time be proposed. Therefore it may be useful to set forth briefly
the case against them.
In the event that "substantial impairment" of scheduled services
by charter competition (or vice versa) appears likely, the State-
ment envisages the use of "[1]icensing tools (geographic limitations,
charter definitions, volume restrictions, etc.) ... to adjust the com-
petition between scheduled services and charter services.. 1. It is
generally accepted that where outside competition makes it impos-
sible to support a level of service genuinely required by the public
interest, both economic and equitable considerations make it de-
sirable to support the service by direct subvention rather than by
restricting the competitor. It remains to point out why certain
arguments which can sometimes be adduced in support of regulatory
protection are not applicable here. These arguments have recently
been conveniently summarized by Alfred E. Kahn,' 7 who has
classified them under six main categories: (i) the imperfections of
competition case; (ii) the discrimination problem; (iii) the pro-
motional case; (iv) externalities, option demand, and the tyranny
of small decisions; (v) offsetting imperfections and the problem of
second best; and (vi) non-economic considerations. Though Kahn's
statement of these arguments is for the most part in terms of entry,
1 Supra note 72, at 7.
117 The Economics of Regulation, Volume II (New York, John Wiley and
Sons, 1971), at 223-46.
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they apply equally well to the "problem" of adding capacity by an
existing occupant of the market.
The imperfection of competition argument has two versions: (a)
Where conditions of long-run decreasing cost require a monopoly
of the service to achieve maximum economies (the so-called
"natural monopoly" case), unregulated competition may result in
a high-cost equilibrium if prospective competitors correctly fore-
see a possibility of being paid off by the incumbent or being cut in
on a high-price oligopoly quasi-agreement. Version (b) envisages
a similar result through errors of judgment on the part of investors
(competitors), or consumers, which cannot readily be corrected
because of immobility of committed resources. Even in the most
favorable technological circumstances-involving marked econo-
mies of scale and heavy fixed investment in resources not readily
transferrable to other markets-these arguments are far from con-
clusive;"' they may safely be disregarded in a field such as air
transportation where these circumstances obviously do not exist.
The discrimination argument suggests that selective competition
in only some markets served by a given firm may produce un-
justified discrimination against the markets unaffected by com-
petition and may even make it impossible to serve them at cost-
covering prices. As Kahn points out, the use of regulatory sanctions
to prevent this sort of result is justified only where it is not in fact
possible to serve the competitive markets alone at a price lower
than that charged or required by the multi-market firm to maintain
a "non-discriminatory" price structure or to support the other
services offered by this firm. But it is exactly this possibility which
has accounted for the success and expansion of the charter airlines.
The promotional case for limiting competition is similar to the
general case for patent legislation: that "competition would pre-
vent those who incurred the costs of promoting an industry's ex-
pansion from appropriating enough of the benefits to justify the
118 Id. at 224: "There is no way of laying down general rules, a priori, for
deciding whether imperfections of competition justify regulation to prevent cream-
skimming. As against the possible imperfections of the competitive process must
be weighed the corresponding imperfections of monopoly or regulation. ...
The burden of any mistakes that are made under competition is borne, in large
measure, by the businessmen themselves; the burden of the mistakes of monopoly
or of its ineffective regulation is borne principally by the consumer. For these
reasons, most economists would incline to the competitive solution."
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effort.. 1. Whether or not one goes along with the general "pioneer-
ing" argument for restrictive regulation in the early days of air
transportation (and in the opinion of this writer, there is good
reason not to go along with it"°), those days have passed. Another
variant of the argument discussed by Kahn-which suggests that
it is correct to block competition on a given segment, for the pur-
pose of maintaining high rates, as long as this is necessary to support
another route segment which covers its own specific marginal
costs-2"'seems to be simply mistaken. In this situation, it is still
(presumably) true that the prospective competitors on the first
segment can serve it alone at a lower rate than had been charged
by the incumbent.
The externalities, option demand, tyranny of small decisions
argument may be adduced in support of curtailing competition
only under certain limited conditions which do not obtain in the
instant case. It is true that "there exists a wide range of situations
[in public service industries] in which the total benefits that society
derives, or thinks it derives, from the continued provision of their
services exceeds what can be collected from their several customers
at prices equated to marginal cost"; and it is also true that "one
external benefit resulting from the actual supply of particular goods
or services [is] the mere availability of the service to nonusers: the
service that they enjoy is the option to use the facilities whenever
they wish. 1 2 But the added burden of supporting the (e.g., off-
season) availability of service can be rightly imposed on the exist-
ing (e.g., high-season) customers only if these customers themselves
would choose to pay the extra price in order not to forego off-season
"'Id. at 233-34.
' Id. at 235: "In most situations, external (that is, taxpayer-financed) sub-
sidies are probably a far more efficient method than the protection of monopoly
for promoting a more rapid industrial development, because they can directly
provide such additional incentives as may be required while taking full advantage
of the promotional effects of competition as well." And again: " . . . it is im-
portant to emphasize that competition may be a much more effective and power-
ful promoter than monopoly. Consider, for example, the very important contri-
bution made to the growth of the U. S. airlines industry by the nonscheduled
carriers. They received no subsidy and were in varying degrees harassed by the
CAB, but persisted in trying by one device or another to get into the lucrative
parts of the business. And by their vigorous promotional efforts, not least of
them the offer of lower rates, it was they who demonstrated how great and elas-
tic was the potential demand for passenger air service."
2 id. at 234.
"1'Id. at 236.
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availability-which cannot be said of the transatlantic tourists. If
it is society as a whole which desires the benefit, the burden should
be borne accordingly.
The weight which one attaches to the offsetting imperfections
argument depends on (i) whether he believes traditional welfare
economics to be a reliable and practical guide for public policy,
and (ii) to what extent he thinks it possible to calculate the di-
rection and degree of "distortion" from the optimum existing in
any particular market. These questions obviously cannot be dealt
with satisfactorily here. The present writer is entirely skeptical on
both counts.12
Finally, it may be contended that certain "noneconomic" bene-
fits-e.g., promotion of the national defense, international good-
will, and the like-may be jeopardized by the vicissitudes of the
unregulated market. One can easily formulate an argument to the
effect that some such aims are promoted by the availability of an
ample supply of year-round international air transportation. But
again, in the unlikely event that this supply should be seriously
threatened by charter competition, there is no reason to suppose
that direct public support would not be forthcoming, or to urge
that the burden should be shifted to the summer traveler.
' A brief indication of the difficulties involved, and a suggestion for an al-
ternative approach, will be found in Keyes, The Proposed Concentrated Industries
Act: A Critique, ANTITRUST BULLETIN (Fall, 1970).
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